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Abstract
Optical networks are vulnerable to physical layer attacks; wiretappers can improperly receive
messages intended for legitimate recipients. Multimode fiber (MMF) transmission can be modeled via
a broadcast channel in which both the legitimate receiver’s and wiretapper’s channels are multiple-
input-multiple-output complex Gaussian channels. Our work considers the theoretical aspect of this
security problem in the domain of a broadcast channel. Source-channel coding analyses based on the
use of distortion as the metric for secrecy are developed. Alice has a source sequence to be encoded and
transmitted over this broadcast channel so that the legitimate user Bob can reliably decode while forcing
the distortion of the wiretapper, or eavesdropper, Eve’s estimate as high as possible. Tradeoffs between
transmission rate and distortion under two extreme scenarios are examined: the best case where Eve has
only her channel output and the worst case where she also knows the past realization of the source. It
is shown that under the best case, an operationally separate source-channel coding scheme guarantees
maximum distortion at the same rate as needed for reliable transmission. Theoretical bounds are given,
and particularized for MMF. Numerical results showing the rate distortion tradeoff are presented and
compared with corresponding results for the perfect secrecy case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Single mode fiber systems are believed to have reached their capacity limits. In particular,
techniques such as wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) and polarization-division multi-
plexing (PDM) have been heavily exploited in the past few years, leaving little room for further
improvement in capacity [1]. Space-division multiplexing (SDM) is a promising solution for
meeting the growing capacity demands of optical communication networks. One way of realizing
SDM is via the use of multimode fiber (MMF). While multimode transmission provides greater
capacity, the security of such systems can be an issue because a wiretapper can eavesdrop
upon MMF communication by simply bending the fiber [2] . MMF is a multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) system [1] that captures the charateristics of crosstalk among different modes.
The secrecy capacity of a Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel was studied in [3], but the result
cannot be applied directly to MMF because the channel is not the same. The secrecy capacity
of this channel was studied in [2] where it is shown that the channel conditions required for
perfect secrecy are quite demanding.
The concepts of “perfect secrecy”, “partial secrecy”, “strong secrecy”, “weak secrecy”, “equiv-
ocation” and “distortion” will be applied repeatedly in this paper. We shall now briefly summarize
the relationships among those terms. Please note that, even though “perfect secrecy” is a non-
asymptotic concept, here for convenience, we refer to “perfect secrecy” in the asymptotic sense,
i.e. the information leakage is arbitrarily small as the blocklength goes to infinity. Information
theoretic secrecy typically considers one of the two regimes, perfect secrecy or partial secrecy.
Perfect secrecy essentially requires no information leakage to the eavesdropper. In the regime of
partial secrecy, one must quantify the degree of secrecy obtained. Equivocation rate is a metric
found in the literature which measures how much of the signal is leaked to the eavesdropper
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regardless of whether the eavesdropper can use the leaked information in a constructive way.
Another approach, taken in this work, is to use distortion to measure the difference between the
original content and eavesdropper’s estimate of it.
The notions of strong and weak secrecy are both referring to the perfect secrecy regime, and
equivocation is usually involved in the analysis. Under either strong or weak secrecy, distortion
is at the maximum, because negligible information is leaked to the eavesdropper that would
allow her to make a better estimate. However, implication in the other direction does not hold
in general. In order to keep the distortion at a maximum, neither strong or weak secrecy is
necessarily required.
This work focuses on the partial secrecy regime. It should be noted that equivocation and
distortion are not two independent measures. As pointed out in recent work [4], equivocation
becomes a special case of distortion when causal information is revealed to the eavesdropper and
the distortion is measured by log loss. It can be seen from our results herein that high distortion
can be achieved even if all the past information of the source is given to the eavesdropper.
Furthermore, partial secrecy comes at a much lower cost than perfect secrecy.
Distortion was also used in [5] and [6] as a metric for secrecy in the context of a noiseless
network with secret key sharing. In this work, we are concerned with physical layer secrecy in
MMF systems. This prompts us to formulate the problem as a source-channel coding problem
along the lines studied in a general setting in [7], some results of which can be directly applied
to MMF systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model in
two ways: the general source-channel coding model for theoretical derivation; and the particular
MMF channel model for application. In Section III, we provide theoretical bounds with source-
channel coding for general broadcast channels. This is our main theoretical contribution of the
paper. In Section IV, we apply the general results from Section III to the MMF model when
the channel is time-invariant and discuss the secrecy outage in the case of a random channel
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in which the channel state information (CSI) is not available to the transmitter. In Section V,
we provide numerical evaluation to the MMF source-channel model under Hamming distortion.
Finally, in Section VI, we conclude the paper and discuss open problems from this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We first introduce some notation that will be used throughout this paper. A sequence X1, ..., Xn
is denoted by Xn. Limit taken with respect to “n → ∞” is abbreviated as “→n”. In the case
that X is a random variable, x is used to denote a realization and X is used to denote the
support of that random variable. R and C are reserved to denote the real field and complex field,
respectively. A complex Gaussian distribution is denoted by CN (µ,Σ, C), where µ is the mean,
Σ is the covariance matrix, and C is the relation matrix. A Markov relation is denoted by the
symbol − −. The total variation distance between two distributions P and Q are denoted by
||P − Q||TV . For a distortion measure d : S × T 7→ R+, the distortion between two sequences
is defined to be the per-letter average distortion d(sk, tk) = 1
k
∑k
i=1 d(si, ti). The maximum
distortion ∆, the average distortion achieved by guesses based only on the prior distribution of
the source, is defined as
∆ , min
t
E[d(S, t)]. (1)
A. Source-Channel Coding Model for General Broadcast Channel
A source node (Alice) has an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence Sk
that she intends to transmit over a memoryless broadcast channel PY Z|X such that a legitimate
user (Bob) can reliably decode the source sequence, while keeping the distortion between an
eavesdropper (Eve) and Alice as high as possible. The source sequence Sk is mapped to the
channel input sequence Xn through a source-channel encoder. Upon receiving Y n, Bob makes an
estimate Sˆk of the original source sequence Sk. Let fk,n : Sk 7→ X n be a source-channel encoder
and gk,n : Yn 7→ Sk be the corresponding decoder. For almost lossless reconstruction, we require
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the probability that Bob’s reconstruction differs from the original goes to zero asymptotically
with the source blocklength. That is,
P
[
Sk 6= Sˆk
]
→k 0.
Similarly, Eve also makes an estimate T k of Sk upon receiving Zn and some other side
information. We will examine two extreme cases based on the amount of side information Eve
has.
Fig. 1: Source-channel coding model with an i.i.d. source and broadcast channel.
1) No causal information available to Eve: The case in which Eve has only her own chan-
nel output but no side information about the source corresponds to the best scenario for the
legitimate users of the network, Alice and Bob. With the channel output alone, Eve has very
limited resources in hand to make the estimate. Let tk be Eve’s estimate of the original source
sequence sk. The system model is shown in Fig. 1; however, the dashed line represents additional
information that is not available to the eavesdropper in this first scenario. We use the lower case
tk(zn) to denote Eve’s deterministic estimation functions of her observation zn and the capital
letter T k = tk(Zn) to denote the function of the random sequence Zn. The following definitions
in this section are for time-invariant channels.
Definition 1. For a given distortion function d(s, t), a rate distortion pair (R,D) is achievable
if there exists a sequence of encoder/decoder pairs fk,n and gk,n such that
k
n
= R,
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lim
n→∞
P
[
Sk 6= Sˆk
]
= 0,
and
lim inf
n→∞
min
tk(zn)
E
[
d(Sk, tk(Zn))
] ≥ D.
Note that the rate-distortion pair (R,D) captures the tradeoff between Bob’s rate for reliable
transmission and Eve’s distortion, which is different from rate-distortion theory in the traditional
sense.
2) With causal information available to Eve: On the other hand, we are also interested in
the case in which, at each time instance j, Eve gets to see the past realization of the source
sequence Sj−1. This would be the worst scenario for the legitimate users. The definition for an
achievable rate distortion pair (R,D) is similar to Definition 1 given in the previous subsection
except the last condition is replaced by
lim inf
n→∞
min
{tj(zn,sj−1)}kj=1
E
[
1
k
k∑
j=1
d(Sj, tj(Z
n, Sj−1)
]
≥ D.
The system model is shown in Fig. 1 with the dashed line representing the availability of the
causal information.
B. MMF Channel Model
Now we particularize the general broadcast channel described above to an MMF broadcast
channel as shown in Fig. 2. An M-mode MMF is modeled as a memoryless MIMO channel
with input X an M-dimensional complex vector. Here M is a positive integer.
Unlike wireless MIMO which has a total power constraint, MMF channels have the following
per mode power constraint averaged over n uses of the channel:
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣X(m)i ∣∣∣2 ≤ 1 for all modes m ∈ [1 : M ]. (2)
More generally (as in [3]), we will consider a power constraint of the form
1
n
n∑
i=1
XiX
†
i  Q, (3)
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Fig. 2: MMF channel model
where Q ∈ {A ∈ HM×M : A  0, Aii = 1} and H denotes the set of Hermitian matrices. One
element in this set is the identity matrix I (constraint (2)). We will focus on the case that Q = I
for simplicity. A detailed discussion of the MMF channel model can be found in [1].
1) The Legitimate User Communications Model: The channel between Alice and Bob PY |X
is complex, Gaussian, MIMO, with input X ∈ CM as described above, and output Y ∈ CM
given by
Y = HX +N, (4)
where N ∼ CN (0, σ2NI, 0) is M-dimensional, uncorrelated, zero-mean, complex, Gaussian noise
and H is an M ×M complex matrix. Bob’s channel matrix H is of the form
H =
√
E0LΨ, (5)
where Ψ ∈ CM×M is unitary and E0L is a constant scalar that measures the average power of
the channel. We refer to E0L/σ2N as the SNR of the channel. Matrix Ψ, the unitary factor of
the channel H , describes the modal crosstalk [1].
2) The Eavesdropper Communications Model: The channel between Alice and Eve PZ|X is
also complex, Gaussian, MIMO, with input X ∈ CM as described above, and output Z ∈ CM
given by
Z = HeX +N e, (6)
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where N e ∼ CN (0, σ2NeI, 0) is M-dimensional uncorrelated, zero-mean, complex, Gaussian
noise, and He is an M ×M complex matrix. Eve’s channel matrix He is of the form
He =
√
E0Le
√
ΦΨe, (7)
where Ψe ∈ CM×M is unitary, Φ is diagonal with positive entries, and E0Le is the average
power of Eve’s channel. Note that Eve has a different signal to noise ratio SNRe = E0Le/σ2Ne .
The diagonal component Φ of the channel matrix He corresponds to the mode-dependent loss
(MDL) as introduced in [1].
III. THEORETICAL BOUNDS
In this section, we focus on the general broadcast channel introduced in Section II-A only. We
first make some general observations about the communication between Alice and Bob, as well as
the communication between Alice and Eve. If Eve is not present, Alice and Bob can communicate
losslessly at any rate lower than R0 , maxX I(X;Y )H(S) because separate source-channel coding is
optimal for point-to-point communication. Ideally, we want to force maximum distortion ∆ upon
Eve. But higher distortion to Eve may come at the price of a lower communication rate to Bob.
The technical content of this section is organized as follows: the rate-distortion region for the
“no causal information” case is first given in Theorem 1; to prepare for the achievability proof
of Theorem 1, an operational separation scheme is discussed; also, an achievable rate-distortion
region is given in Theorem 5 for the causal case under Hamming distortion; and finally, an
example with a binary symmetric channel and Hamming distortion is provided for illustration.
Before starting the new results, we shall provide a recap of what have been done in the literature
regarding this problem and what our main advances are in this work. For noiseless channels, the
source coding problems of both the no-causal-information and the causal-information cases were
solved in [8] and [6], respectively. There, secrecy was obtained by using a secret key shared
between Alice and Bob. As for physical layer secrecy of a memoryless broadcast channel, the
result for transmitting two messages, one confidential and one public, from Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [9]
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have been known for many decades. In their work, weak secrecy were considered. This result was
strengthened in [10] by considering strong secrecy. The same rate region was obtained in [10],
however the metric for secrecy is stronger. In our work, the source-channel coding schemes we
propose operationally separate source and channel coding that require dividing the bit sequence
produced by source coding into two messages which are then processed by the channel coding.
The channel coding part functions in a way that is similar to [9] or [10], except that the public
message in their work is not required to be decoded in our case, and we refer to that message
as the “non-confidential” message. This type of channel coding setting was also used in [7]
for the causal-information case and it is shown that only weak secrecy is required to combine
the source and channel coding. In this work, we will connect the source coding (from [8]) and
channel coding for the no-causal-information case. Unlike the causal-information case, strong
secrecy from the channel is needed. This will require modifying some of the settings from [10].
We also extend the result for the causal-information case from [7] to include the rate-distortion
tradeoff.
We now state the rate-distortion result for general source-channel coding with an i.i.d. source
sequence and a discrete memoryless broadcast channel PY Z|X when no causal information is
available to Eve. In the following theorem, we will see that the source sequence can be delivered
almost losslessly to Bob at a rate arbitarily close to R0 while the distortion to Eve is kept at ∆,
as long as the secrecy capacity is positive.
Theorem 1. For an i.i.d. source sequence Sk and memoryless broadcast channel PY Z|X , if there
exists W− −X− −Y Z such that I(W ; Y ) − I(W ;Z) > 0, then (R,D) is achievable if and
only if
R <
maxX I(X ; Y )
H(S)
, (8)
D ≤ ∆, (9)
where ∆ was defined in (1).
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Remark: The requirement I(W ; Y )− I(W ;Z) > 0 implies the existence of a secure channel
with a positive rate, i.e. the eavesdropper’s channel is not less noisy than the intended receiver’s
channel. So instead of demanding a high secure transmission rate with perfect secrecy to
accommodate the description of the source, we need only to ensure the existence of a secure
channel with positive rate. This will suffice to ensure the eavesdropper’s distortion is maximal.
The converse is straightforward. Each of the inequalities (8) and (9) is true individually for any
channel and source, (8) by channel capacity coupled by optimality of source-channel separation,
and (9) by definition.
The idea for achievability is to operationally separate the source and channel coding (see Fig.
3). The source encoder compresses the source and splits the resulting message into a confidential
message and a non-confidential message. A channel encoder is concatenated digitally with the
source encoder so that the channel delivers both the confidential and non-confidential messages
reliably to Bob and keeps the confidential message secret from Eve, as in [9]. The overall source-
channel coding rate will have the following form: R = k
n
= k
log |M|
· log |M|
n
= Rch
Rsrc
, where |M|
is the total cardinality of the confidential and the non-confidential messages; Rch and Rsrc are
the channel coding and source coding rates, respectively.
Let us look at two models in the following subsections that will help us establish the platform
for showing the achievability of Theorem 1.
Fig. 3: Operational separate source-channel coding: the confidential and non-confidential messages satisfy Ms ∈
[1 : 2kR
′
s = 2nRs ] and Mp ∈ [1 : 2kR′p = 2nRp ]
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A. Channel Coding and Strong Secrecy
Consider a memoryless broadcast channel PY Z|X and a communication system with a confi-
dential message Ms and a non-confidential message Mp that must allow the intended receiver
to decode both Ms and Mp while keeping the eavesdropper from learning anything about Ms.
Problems like this were first studied by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [9] in 1978, as an extension of
Wyner’s work in [11]. However, their model and our model differ in that the second receiver in
their setting is required to decode the public message Mp. The mathematical formulation and
result of our channel model is stated below. We focus on the message pairs (Ms,Mp) whose
distribution satisfies the following:
PMs|Mp=mp(ms) = 2
−nRs (10)
for all (ms, mp). Later we will show a source encoder can always prepare the input messages
to the channel of this form.
Definition 2. A (Rs, Rp, n) channel code consists of a channel encoder Fc (possibly stochastic)
and a channel decoder gc such that
Fc :Ms ×Mp 7→ X n
and
gc : Yn 7→ Ms ×Mp
where |Ms| = 2nRs and |Mp| = 2nRp .
Definition 3. The rate pair (Rs, Rp) is achievable under weak secrecy if for all (Ms,Mp)
satisfying (10), there exists a sequence of (Rs, Rp, n) channel codes such that
lim
n→∞
P
[
(Ms,Mp) 6= (Mˆs, Mˆp)
]
= 0
and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp) = 0.
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Note that because the eavesdropper may completely or partially decode Mp, the secrecy re-
quirement is modified accordingly to consider I(Ms;Zn|Mp) instead of I(Ms;Zn). To guarantee
true secrecy of Ms, we want to make sure that even if Mp is given to the eavesdropper, there
is no information leakage of Ms, because I(Ms;Zn|Mp) = I(Ms;Zn,Mp) if Ms and Mp are
independent.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 3 in [7]). A rate pair (Rs, Rp) is achievable under weak secrecy if
Rs ≤ I(W ; Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V ), (11)
Rp ≤ I(V ; Y ) (12)
for some V− −W− −X− −Y Z.
The proof can be found in [7]. Let us denote the above region as R. We now strengthen
the result by considering strong secrecy introduced in [12]. Later we will use strong secrecy to
connect the operationally separate source and channel encoders.
Definition 4. The rate pair (Rs, Rp) is achievable under strong secrecy if for all (Ms,Mp)
satisfying (10), there exists a sequence of (Rs, Rp, n) channel codes such that
lim
n→∞
P[(Mp,Ms) 6= (Mˆs, Mˆp)] = 0
and
lim
n→∞
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp) = 0.
In general, weak secrecy does not necessarily imply that strong secrecy is also achievable;
however, in this particular setting we have the following claim:
Theorem 3. A rate pair (Rs, Rp) achievable under weak secrecy is also achievable under strong
secrecy.
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The following two lemmas will assist the proof of Theorem 3 by providing a sufficient
condition for satisfying the secrecy constraint limn→∞ I(Ms;Zn|Mp) = 0.
Lemma 1. If ||PZn|Mp=mpPMs|Mp=mp − PZnMs|Mp=mp ||TV ≤ ǫ ≤ 12 , then
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp = mp) ≤ −ǫ log ǫ|Ms| .
Proof: Let ǫzn =
∣∣∣∣PMs|Mp=mp − PMs|Zn=zn,Mp=mp∣∣∣∣TV . Therefore,
EPZn|Mp=mp
[ǫzn ] =
∣∣∣∣PZn|Mp=mpPMs|Mp=mp − PZnMs|Mp=mp∣∣∣∣TV ≤ ǫ.
By Lemma 2.7 [13], |H(Ms|Mp = mp)−H(Ms|Zn = zn,Mp = mp)| ≤ −ǫzn log ǫzn|Ms| . Note
that f(x) , −x log x is concave. And by applying Jensen’s inequality twice, we have
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp = mp) =
∣∣∣EPZn|Mp=mp [H(Ms|Mp = mp)−H(Ms|Zn = zn,Mp = mp)]
∣∣∣
≤ EPZn|Mp=mp [|H(Ms|Mp = mp)−H(Ms|Zn = zn,Mp = mp)|]
≤ EPZn|Mp=mp
[
−ǫzn log ǫzn|Ms|
]
≤ −ǫ log ǫ|Ms| .
Lemma 2. If for every (ms, mp), there exists a measure θmp on Zn such that
||PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms − θmp ||TV ≤ ǫn
then
lim
n→∞
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp) = 0
where ǫn = 2−nβ for some β > 0.
A proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A.
If there exist channel codes such that P
[
(Ms,Mp) 6= (Mˆs, Mˆp)
]
→n 0 and measure θmp for
all (ms, mp) such that ||PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms−θmp ||TV ≤ ǫn, then Theorem 3 follows immediately.
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The existence of such a code and measure is assured by the same codebook construction and
choice of measure as in [10].
B. Source Coding
Recall from our problem setup in Section II that the sender Alice has an i.i.d. source sequence
Sk. A source encoder is needed to prepare Sk by encoding it into a pair of messages (Ms,Mp)
that satisfies PMs|Mp=mp(ms) = 2−kR
′
s = 2−nRs so that it forms a legitmate input to the channel
model in Section III-A.
Definition 5. An (R′s, R′p, k) source code consists of an encoder fs and a decoder gs such that
fs : Sk 7→ Ms ×Mp
gs :Ms ×Mp 7→ Sk
where |Ms| = 2kR′s and |Mp| = 2kR′p.
Definition 6. A rate distortion triple (R′s, R′p, D) is achievable under a given distortion measure
d(s, t) if there exists a sequence of (R′s, R′p, k) source codes such that
lim
k→∞
P
[
Sk 6= gs(fs(Sk))
]
= 0
and the message pair generated by the source encoder satisfies PMs|Mp=mp(ms) = 2−kR′s and
for all PZn|MsMp such that I(Ms;Zn|Mp)→n 0
lim inf
k→∞
min
tk(zn)
E
[
dk(Sk, tk(Zn))
] ≥ D.
Theorem 4. (R′s, R′p, D) is achievable if
R′s > 0,
R′s +R
′
p > H(S),
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and
D ≤ ∆.
The general idea for achievability is to consider the ǫ-typical Sk sequences and partition them
into bins of equal size so that each bin contains sequences of the same type. The identity Mp of
the bin is revealed to all parties, but the identity Ms of each sequence inside a bin is perfectly
protected. 1 Each of such partitions is treated as a codebook. It was shown in [8] that, for the
noiseless case in which Eve is given mp instead of zn, the distortion averaged over all such
codebooks achieves the maximum distortion ∆ as k → ∞ and therefore there must exist one
partition that achieves ∆. In order to transition from the result in [8] to our claim in Theorem
4, we only need to show
min
tk(zn)
E
[
dk(Sk, tk(Zn))
] ≥ min
tk(mp)
E
[
dk(Sk, tk(Mp))
]
.
Proof: First, observe that
min
tk(·)
E
[
dk(Sk, tk(·))] = 1
k
k∑
i=1
min
t(i,·)
E [d(Si, t(i, ·))] (13)
Next, we claim the channel output sequence zn does not provide Eve anything more than mp
and therefore
min
t(i,zn)
E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
d(Si, t(i, Z
n))
]
≥ min
t(i,mp)
E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
d(Si, t(i,Mp))
]
− 2δ′(ǫ) (14)
The analysis is similar to that in [7], but for the sake of clarity, we present the complete proof
of (14) in Appendix B. Here strong secrecy comes into play. This is also pointed out within the
proof in Appendix B that I(Ms;Zn|Mp)→n 0 is needed.
Finally, combining (14) with (13) give us the desired result.
1Strictly speaking, the source encoder may violate the condition (10) on (k+1)|S| number of bins, because (k+1)|S| is an
upper bound on the number of types of sequence with length k. However, this is just a very small (polynomial in k) number
of bins compared with the total number (roughly 2kH(S)) of bins. Therefore, for this small portion of “bad” bins that violates
(10), we can just let the source encoder declare an error on the confidential message Ms and constructs a dummy Ms uniformly
given the bin index mp. This will contribute only an ǫ factor to the error probability.
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C. Achievability of Theorem 1
With all the elements from Section III-A and III-B, we are now ready to harvest the achiev-
ability proof of Theorem 1 using Theorems 2 and 4 by concatenating the channel encoder with
the source encoder.
Proof: Fix ν ≥ ǫ > 0. Fix PS . Let Rs′ = 2ν, Rp′ = H(S) − ν and R′ = Rs′ + Rp′. We
apply the same codebook construction and encoding scheme as in Section III-B by partioning
the ǫ-typical Sk sequences into 2kRp′ bins and inside each bin we have 2kRs′ sequences so that
P[Sk 6= gs(fs(Sk))] ≤ ǫ. Recall that all the sequences inside one bin are of the same type, so it
is guaranteed that
PMs|Mp=mp(ms) =
1
|Ms| =
1
2kR′s
for all mp, ms, which implies I(Ms;Mp) = 0.
Let Rs and Rp be the channel rates. Rp is seen as a function of Rs on the boundary of
the region given in Theorem 2 and this is denoted by Rp(Rs). Suppose max(Rs,Rp)∈RRs > 0,
i.e. there exists W− −X− −Y Z such that I(W ; Y ) − I(W ;Z) > 0 (justified in Appendix
C). Rp(Rs) is continuous and non-increasing. Thus, Rp achieves the maximum at Rs = 0,
which would be the channel capacity maxX I(X ; Y ) of PY |X for reliable transmission. By the
continuity of Rp(Rs), (Rs, Rp) = (2ν kn , Rp(0) − δ(ν)) is achievable under strong secrecy, i.e.
P[(Ms,Mp) 6= (Mˆs, Mˆp)] ≤ ǫ and I(Ms;Zn|Mp) ≤ ǫ, where δ(ν)→ 0 as ν → 0.
From the above good channel code under strong secrecy we have PZn|MsMp such that I(Ms;Zn|Mp)→n
0. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 4 to achieve
lim inf
k→∞
min
tk(zn)
E
[
dk(Sk, tk(Zn))
]
= D.
The error probability is bounded by the sum of the error probabilities from the source coding
and channel coding parts i.e. P
[
Sk 6= Sˆk
]
< 2ǫ. Finally, we verify the total transmission rate to
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complete the proof:
R =
k
n
=
Rs +Rp
R′s +R
′
p
=
Rp(0)− δ(ν) + 2Rν
H(S) + ν
≥ Rp(0)− δ(ν)
H(S) + ν
ν→0−→ maxX I(X ; Y )
H(S)
.
We next state the rate-distortion result for source-channel coding with an i.i.d. source sequence
and discrete memoryless broadcast channel PY Z|X when causal information is available to Eve.
The result comes from the rate matching of [7].
Theorem 5. For an i.i.d. source sequence Sk and a memoryless broadcast channel PY Z|X , a
rate distortion pair (R,D) is achievable if
R ≤ min
(
I(V ; Y )
I(S;U)
,
I(W ; Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V )
H(S|U)
)
,
D ≤ α
R
·∆+
(
1− α
R
)
·min
t(u)
E [d(S, t(U))]
for some distribution PSPU |SPV PW |V PX|WPY Z|X , where α = [I(V ;Y )−I(V ;Z)]+I(S;U) .
Example: binary symmetric broadcast channel (BSBCC) and binary source with Hamming
distortion
To visualize Theorem 1 and Theorem 5, we will illustrate the results with a BSBCC and
binary source under Hamming distortion, defined as
dH(s, t) =


0, s = t,
1, otherwise.
With the above setting, suppose Si ∼ Bern(p), and the broadcast channel is binary symmetric
with crossover probabilities to the intended receiver and the eavesdropper p1 and p2, respectively.
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Assume p ≤ 0.5 and p1 < p2 < 0.5. It is well known that this can be treated as a physically
degraded channel in capacity calculation. Let us make the following definitions:
f(x) is the linear interpolation of the points
(
log n,
n− 1
n
)
, n = 1, 2, 3, ... (15)
d(x) , min(f(x), 1−max
s
PS(s)), (16)
h(x) , x log
1
x
+ (1− x) log 1
1− x is the binary entropy function, (17)
x1 ∗ x2 , x1 ∗ (1− x2) + (1− x1) ∗ x2 is the binary convolution, (18)
where PS(·) is the probability mass function of the random variable S. The corresponding rate-
distortion regions for the no-causal-information and causal-information cases are given in the
following corollaries.
Corollary 1. For an i.i.d. Bern(p) source sequence Sk and BSBCC with crossover probabilities
p1 and p2, when no causal information is available, (R,D) is achievable if and only if
R <
1− h(p1)
h(p)
,
D ≤ p.
Corollary 2. For an i.i.d. Bern(p) source sequence Sk and BSBCC with crossover probabilities
p1 and p2, when causal information is available, (R,D) is achievable if
R ≤ h(p2)− h(p1)
h(p)
,
D ≤ p
or
h(p2)− h(p1)
h(p)
< R ≤ 1− h(p1)
h(p)
,
D ≤ α′p+ (1− α′)d
(
h(γ ∗ p1)− h(γ ∗ p2)− h(p1) + h(p2)
R
)
where γ ∈ [0, 0.5] solves h(γ ∗ p2) = 1− h(p1) + h(p2)− Rh(p) and α′ = h(γ∗p2)−h(γ∗p1)1−h(γ∗p1) .
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These corollaries result directly from applying Theorem 1 and Theorem 5, respectively. The
region given in Corollary 2 is calculated in a similar fashion as the region given by Theorem 7 of
[7]. An numerical example with p = 0.3, p1 = 0.1 and p2 = 0.2 is plotted in Fig.4. Interpretation
of the plot is deferred until the end of Section V.
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Fig. 4: Achievable distortion-rate curves. On the horizontal axis is the symbol/channel use source-channel coding
rate and on the vertical axis is the average Hamming distortion.
IV. MMF MAIN RESULTS
A. Fixed MMF Channel
We now apply the above result to the MMF model introduced in Section II-B by finding the
rate distortion regions for the MMF model defined in (4) and (6) under the two scenarios. In
this section, as before, we assume the channels are time-invariant. First of all, we will give the
achievable rate region under strong secrecy (therefore also under weak secrecy).
Theorem 6. The following rate region for one confidential and one non-confidential message is
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achievable under strong secrecy for a complex Gaussian channel:
Rs ≤ log |HKH
† + σ2NI|
|σ2NI|
− log |H
eKHe† + σ2NeI|
|σ2NeI|
(19)
Rp ≤ log |HQH
† + σ2NI|
|HKH† + σ2NI|
(20)
for some K and Q, where 0  K  Q, K ∈ HM×M , Q satisfies the power constraint in (3),
and H and He are the channel gain matrices.
Proof: According to Theorem 2 and 3,
Rs ≤ I(W ; Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V ) (21)
Rp ≤ I(V ; Y ) (22)
for some V− −W− −X− −Y Z and E[XX†]  Q, is an achievable rate pair.
We restrict the channel input X to be a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector. Let
V ∼ CN (0, Q−K, 0), B ∼ CN (0, K, 0) such that B and V are independent, and W = X =
V +B. Therefore, X ∼ CN (0, Q, 0) satisfies the power constraint. Similar to results in [3], the
rate pair (Rs, Rp) satisfying inequalities (19) and (20) can be achieved.
An immediate corollary follows directly from the above theorem.
Corollary 3. The following rate pairs are achievable under strong secrecy for MMF with channel
gains defined in (5) and (7) and equal full power allocation Q = I:
Rs ≤ log |SNRK + I||SNReΨeKΨe†Φ+ I| (23)
Rp ≤ log |(SNR + 1)I||SNRK + I| (24)
for some K where 0  K  I , K ∈ HM×M , SNR = E0L/σ2N and SNRe = E0Le/σ2Ne .
With the secrecy capacity region of MMF, we can evaluate its rate distortion region (R,D)
under the two extreme cases, without and with causal information at Eve’s decoder respectively.
For the best case scenario (no causal information), we will give a sufficient condition to force
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maximum distortion ∆ between Alice and Eve. For the worst case scenario (with causal in-
formation), we will give an achievable rate-distortion region and look at the particular case of
Hamming distortion.
Theorem 7. For an i.i.d source sequence Sk, if
min
j∈{1,...,M}
φ¯j <
SNR
SNRe (25)
where φ¯j’s are the diagonal entries of Φ, then the following rate distortion pair (R,D) is
achievable with no causal information at the eavesdropper:
R <
M log(SNR + 1)
H(S)
(26)
D ≤ ∆. (27)
Theorem 7 follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 3. Note that (25) is a sufficient condition
for the existence of a secure channel with strictly positive rate from Alice to Bob. A discussion
of this condition is provided in Appendix D.
Theorem 8. For an i.i.d. source sequence Sk and Hamming distortion, the following distortion
rate curve D(R) is in the achievable region with causal information at the eavesdropper:
D = d(H(S)), if R ≤ R
∗
s
H(S)
(28)
D = α¯(K)∆ + (1− α¯(K)) d
(
Rs(K)
R
)
, if R
∗
s
H(S)
< R ≤ R
∗
p
H(S)
(29)
where d(·) is as defined in (16); K , {K ∈ HM×M , 0  K  I},
R∗s = max
K ′∈K
log
|SNRK ′ + I|
|SNRe√ΦΨeK ′Ψe†√Φ+ I| ,
R∗p = M log(SNR + 1),
Rs(K) = log
|SNRK + I|
|SNRe√ΦΨeKΨe†√Φ + I| ,
α¯(K) =
β¯(K)− γ¯(K)
β¯(K)
,
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β¯(K) = log
|(SNR + 1)I|
|SNRK + I| ,
γ¯(K) = log
|SNReΦ+ I|
|SNRe√ΦΨeKΨe†√Φ+ I| .
The result given in Theorem 8 can be derived directly from Theorem 5 and Corollary 3.
B. Secrecy Outage under Random MMF Channel
All the results we have seen thus far were derived for a time-invariant channel, which means
that both the transmitter and the receivers are informed about the channel state. However, in
MMF, the channels H and He vary with time and the CSI is not available at the transmitter
due to the long round-trip delay over the large distances common in optical transmission, even
though it has a long coherence time, i.e. H and He are essentially constant over n channel uses.
In Corollary 2, Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, we have chosen Q = I as the channel input power
for simplicity. This power allocation strategy also tends to minimize the outage probability for
perfect secrecy [14].
The randomness of H =
√
E0LΨ and He =
√
E0Le
√
ΦΨe comes from the unitary component
Ψ, Ψe and the diagonal component Φ. The random matrices Ψ and Ψe are uniformly distributed
in ⊖, where ⊖ is the set of all M × M unitary matrices [1]. The diagonal matrix Φ =
diag{φ¯1, ..., φ¯M}, where φ¯i = M φi∑M
j=1 φj
. Here φ1 = φmin and φmax, and φi ∼ Unif [φmin, φmax]
for i = 3, ...,M .
In this situation of no CSI at the transmitter with long coherence time, performance is
typically measured by outage probability. The capacity C = maxQ log |I +HQH†| and secrecy
capacity Cs = maxQ
[
log |I +HQH†| − log |I +HeQHe†|] for a deterministic MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel were given in [15] and [16], respectively. For the case of no causal information
at the eavesdropper, the CSI does not really affect the performance much. The channel capacity
between Alice and Bob M log(1 + SNR) does not depend on the channel realization due to the
unitary component of the channel. Hence, the encoder can choose the source-channel coding rate
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to be just below M log(SNR+1)
H(S)
, and maximum distortion can be achieved if the channel satisfies the
condition in Theorem 7. For the case where Eve has causal source information, we consider only
the input power Q = I and Hamming distortion. Without knowledge of CSI, the source-channel
encoder picks a source-channel coding rate R¯, a pair of source coding rates (R¯′s, R¯′p) on the line
segment R′s +R′p = H(S), R′s, R′p ≥ 0 and a real value α ∈ [0, 1]. Let
R¯s , R¯
′
sR¯ and R¯p , R¯′pR¯.
We define the outage probability of such a choice of parameters to be
Pout(I, R¯
′
s, R¯, α) = 1−
∑
K∈K
PΦΨeΨ
[
(R¯s, R¯p) ∈ RΦΨeΨ(I) and α¯(K) ≥ α
]
,
where RΦΨeΨ(I) denotes the region given in Corollary 3, K = {K : 0  K  I, R¯s =
log |SNRK+I|
|SNReΨeKΨe†Φ+I| and R¯p = log
|(SNR+1)I|
|SNRK+I| },and α¯(K) is defined as in Theorem 8. Note that
RΦΨeΨ(Q) is a random variable because the channels PY Z|X are now random. Under this set
of parameters (R¯′s, R¯, α), we can achieve distortion α∆ + (1 − α)d(R¯′s) with probability 1 −
Pout(I, R¯
′
s, R¯, α), where d(·) was defined in (16). Proving the existence of a good codebook in
this case is an important information theoretic problem, most recently addressed in [17].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results illustrating achievable rate distortion regions
of an MMF under the two information models with a time-invariant channel. Let us consider
measuring the eavesdropper’s distortion using Hamming distortion and a Bern(p) i.i.d. source
sequence. Fig. 3 shows numerical results corresponding to Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 under
equal power allocation. The channels are simulated as a 4−mode MMF with SNR = 20dB,
SNRe = 10dB, and MDL = 20dB.
In each plot, the vertical line on the right is the maximum reliable transmission rate between
Alice and Bob and the vertical line on the left is the maximum perfect secrecy transmission rate
that can be obtained with separate source-channel coding. The horizontal line is the maximum
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distortion which is also the rate distortion curve from Theorem 7 with no causal information at
Eve. The curve obtained from Theorem 8 shows the tradeoff between the transmission rate
between Alice and Bob and the distortion forced on Eve with causal information. We see
in Fig. 5(a), p = 0.3, that with our source-channel coding analysis, we gain a free region
for maximum distortion, as if under perfect secrecy, (from the left vertical line to the kink)
because we effectively use the redundancy of the source. In Fig. 5(b) with p = 0.5, since
there is no redundancy in the source, the distortion curve drops immediately after the maximum
perfect secrecy rate. Note that the transmission rates are not considered beyond the right vertical
lines because they are above the maximum reliable transmission rates and Bob cannot losslesly
reconstruct the source sequences.
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Fig. 5: Achievable distortion-rate curves. On the left is the Bern(0.3) i.i.d. source case and on the right is the
Bern(0.5) i.i.d. source case. On the horizontal axes are the symbol/channel use source-channel coding rate and on
the vertical axes are the average Hamming distortions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have examined the rate-distortion-based secrecy performance of an insecure
MMF communication system. The sender is assumed to have an i.i.d. source sequence which
the intended receiver and the eavesdropper both try to reconstruct. Two source-channel coding
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models with different information availability at the eavesdropper have been considered. We
have shown that, when no causal source information is disclosed to the eavesdropper, under a
general broadcast channel and any distortion measure, it is possible to send the source at the
maximum rate that guarantees lossless reconstruction at the intended receiver while keeping the
distortion at the eavesdropper as high as if it only has the source prior distribution. When the
past source realization is causally disclosed to the eavesdropper, we have applied the theoretical
results in [7] to the particular case of an MMF channel. Numerical results for an i.i.d. Bernoulli
source and Hamming distortion have been provided.
Only the theoretical formulation is given to calculate the secrecy outage probability for random
MMF under equal full power allocation Q = I . The optimality of this power strategy and
the statistics for different sets of parameters given in Section IV-B remain an open problem.
Moreover, in our model, it is required that the intended receiver reconstruct the source losslessly.
In a more general setting, one can allow lossy reconstruction of the source at the intended receiver,
which is an interesting problem for further research.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Given (ms, mp), suppose there exists θmp such that
||PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms − θmp ||TV ≤ ǫn (30)
where ǫn = 2−nβ for some β > 0. Then we have the following:
||PZn|Mp=mp − θmp ||TV
=
∑
zn
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp(zn)− θmp(zn)∣∣ (31)
=
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ms
PMs|Mp=mp(ms)PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(z
n)−
∑
ms
PMs|Mp=mp(ms)θmp(z
n)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ms
1
|Ms|PZ
n|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(z
n)−
∑
ms
1
|Ms|θmp(z
n)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
zn
∑
ms
1
|Ms|
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(zn)− θmp(zn)∣∣ (32)
=
∑
ms
1
|Ms|
∑
zn
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(zn)− θmp(zn)∣∣
≤
∑
ms
1
|Ms|ǫn (33)
= ǫn (34)
where (32) follows from triangle inequality and (33) follows from (30).
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||PZn|Mp=mpPMs|Mp=mp − PZnMs|Mp=mp||TV
=
∑
zn
∑
ms
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp(zn)PMs|Mp=mp(ms)− PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(zn)PMs|Mp=mp(ms)∣∣
=
1
|Ms|
∑
zn
∑
ms
∣∣Pzn|Mp=mp(zn)− PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(zn)∣∣
=
1
|Ms|
∑
zn
∑
ms
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp(zn)− θmp(zn) + θmp(zn)− PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(zn)∣∣
≤ 1|Ms|
∑
zn
∑
ms
(
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp(zn)− θmp(zn)∣∣+ ∣∣PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(zn)− θmp(zn)∣∣)
=
1
|Ms|
∑
ms
(
∑
zn
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp(zn)− θmp(zn)∣∣+∑
zn
∣∣PZn|Mp=mp,Ms=ms(zn)− θmp(zn)∣∣)
≤ 1|Ms|
∑
ms
(ǫn + ǫn)
= 2ǫn
By applying Lemma 1, we have
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp) =
∑
mp
PMp(mp)I(Ms;Z
n|Mp = mp)
≤
∑
mp
PMp(mp)(−2ǫn log
2ǫn
|Ms|)
≤ 2 · 2−nβ(nRs) (35)
where (35) goes to 0 as n→∞.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (14)
For each i, we have
I(Si;Z
n|Mp) ≤ I(MsSi;Zn|Mp)
= I(Ms;Z
n|Mp) + I(Si;Zn|MsMp)
≤ ǫ (36)
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for large enough n. (36) follows from strong secrecy of the channel and Fano’s inequality. Note
that weak secrecy is not sufficient to give us the desired result in our proof. We now define
Pi , PSiZnMp
P¯i , PMpPSi|MpPZn|Mp
i.e. P¯i is the Markov chain Si− −Mp− −Zn. By Pinsker’s inequality,
||Pi − P¯i||TV ≤ 1√
2
D(Pi||P¯i) 12
=
1√
2
I(Si;Z
n|Mp) 12
≤
√
ǫ
2
(37)
min
t(i,zn)
E[d(Si, t(i, Z
n))] ≥ min
t(i,zn,mp)
E[d(Si, t(i, Z
n,Mp))]
≥ min
t(i,zn,mp)
EP¯i[d(Si, t(i, Z
n,Mp))]− δ′(ǫ) (38)
= min
t(i,mp)
EP¯i [d(Si, t(i,Mp))]− δ′(ǫ) (39)
≥ min
t(i,mp)
E[d(Si, t(i,Mp))]− 2δ′(ǫ) (40)
where (38) and (40) use the fact that Pi and P¯i are close in total variation from (37); (39) uses
the Markov relation Si− −Mp− −Zn of distribution P¯i. The technical details can be found in
Lemma 2 and 3 from [7]. Averaging over k, we obtain (14).
APPENDIX C
JUSTIFICATION OF THE CONDITION max(Rs,Rp)∈RRs > 0
From Theorem 2 or 3, we have
max
(Rs,Rp)∈R
Rs > 0
is equivalent to
I(W ; Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V ) > 0 (41)
DRAFT October 9, 2018
SUBMITTED PAPER 29
for some V− −W− −X− −Y Z. We claim this can be simplified to
I(W ; Y )− I(W ;Z) > 0 (42)
for some W− −X− −Y Z.
To see (42) ⇒ (41), we can simply let V = ø. To see (41) ⇒ (42), observe that if there
exists V− −W− −X− −Y Z such that (41) holds, then there has to exist at least one value v
such that I(W ; Y |V = v)− I(W ;Z|V = v) > 0. We can redefine the distribution as PW¯ X¯Y¯ Z¯ ,
PWXY Z|V=v. It can be verified that the Markovity W¯− −X¯− −Y¯ Z¯ holds and PY¯ Z¯|X¯ = PY Z|X .
APPENDIX D
SUFFICIENT CONDITION ON THEOREM 7
From Theorem 1 and Corollary 3, we know that a sufficient condition for the eavesdropper’s
channel not being less noisy than the intended receiver’s channel is
max
K∈HM×M ,0KI
|SNRK + I|
|SNReΨeKΨe†Φ+ I| > 1. (43)
However, (43) is computationally heavy to verify. If we restrict K to be of the form K = Ψe†ΛΨe
where Λ is diagonal with diagonal entries λi ∈ [0, 1], then (43) has a much simpler form:
∏M
i=1(1 + SNRλi)∏M
i=1(1 + SNR
eλiφ¯i)
> 1. (44)
Therefore, if there exists a j ∈ {1, ...,M} such that φ¯j < SNRSNRe , we can choose λj = 1 and
λi = 0 for i 6= j to satisfy (44).
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